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I'm Bi ll Whelan from the Rand Corporation. I'd like to present a 
brief and somewhat general set of comments on diagnostic aid systems. 
The corrrnents are general because I am sunnarizing previous and ongoing 
Rand s tudy efforts. 
As you may be aware, Rand has done cons iderabl e work for t he Air 
Force in severa l areas rel ated to diagnostic aid systems, such as investi -
gations of engine health monitoring systems and studies of aircraft main-
tenance policies and programs. Recently, Rand has undertaken, under ARPA 
sponsorship, a project to assess the utility and cost-effectiveness of 
diagnostic aid systems for U.S. Army ground vehicles. My exampl es will 
be drawn from the findings of this study. The relationsh ip between 
diagnostic aid systems and NO[ is left as an exercise for the reader. 
The utility of diagnostic aid systems can be reflected in increased 
operational readi ness for various kinds of mil itary equipment, as well 
as increased maintenance efficiency. I'm sure you have heard these words 
before, and I' ll discuss these t hemes subsequently. 
I have to thank Don Thompson for the idea for the firs t figure (Fig. l) 
"Diagnostic /\id Systems (Theory)." T rea li ze it' s a gross exaggeration to 
say that this figur e shov~s the theory of diagnostic aid systems. Of course, 
it merely sugges t s the idea behind them: that is, that somehow, using a 
diagnostic parameter, some measured characteristic of a system can be 
related to the state or s tatus of the system. Hopefully, a healthy system 
can be di stinguished from a system that is in some s tage of failing, and a 
system that has failed. This al so applies to a sub- system or component. 
A diagnosti c aid system can be defined as being made up of three 
subsystems (see Fig. 2) : a sensi ng subsystem, whose function is obvious; 
an infonnation processi ng and display subsystem; and f inally, a fa ilure 
model (see Fig. 3). Many people rai se the question, "l~hat are you doing 
call ing a failure mode l a subsystem of a di ag nostic aid system?" Well, 
I think it's the most important cotnponent of the diagnostic aid system. 
This i s the rationale: The fai lure model defines failure (at l east 
our interpretation of failure) and also establishes the fundamental limits 
of error of the system . Thi s provides gu idance for t he desi gn and use of 
diagnostic aid systems , including dec iding what to do with the data and 
what kind of repair or replacement action to take. 
15 
  
DIAGNOSTIC AID SYSTEMS (THEORY) 
FIND DIAGNOSTIC PARAMETER(S) WHICH CAN BE RELATED TO EQUIP MENT 
COND ITION AND TO SOME SENSE D CHARACTERISTIC(S) OF THE 
EQUIPMENT, ITS SUBSYSTEM(S) AND / OR COMPONENTS 
EQUIPMENT 
CONDITION 
DIAGNOSTIC PARAMETER(S) 
FA I LED 
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of equipment condition characterization by 
diagnostic aid systems. 
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DIAGNOSTIC AID SYSTEM 
SUB-SYSTEM 
e SENSING 
e INFORMATION 
PROCESSING / DISPLAY 
e FAILURE MODEL!S) 
FUNCTION 
DETECT / MEASURE CHARACTERISTIC(S) 
RELATED TO DIAGNOSTIC PARAMETER(S) 
COLLECT, CONVERT AND DISPLAY SENSING 
SUBSYSTEM OUTPUT INTO DIAGNOSTIC 
PARAMETER(S) UNITS 
RELATE DIAGNOSTIC PARAMETER(S) 
TO FAILURE 
Fig. 2. Subsystem of diagnostic aid systems and their functions. 
  
FAILURE MODEL 
e CRITICAL PART OF DIAGNOSTIC AID SYSTEM 
e TYPES 
- DEFINES FAILURE(SJ - RELATES DATA TO ACTION 
- PROVIDES DESIGN / USE GUIDANCE 
- DffiRMINES ERROR RATES 
- THEORETICAL 
- EMPIRICAL 
PHYSICS, ENGINEERING ESTIMATES, INTUITION 
FAILURE DATA 
• PROBLEMS 
- MOST MODELS ARE INTUITIVE OR ENG. ESTIMATES 
- MOST MODELS DERIVED FROM FAILURE DATA ARE BASED ON FAILURE 
RATES NOT MODES 
- FAILURE RATES OFTEN EQUATED TO REPLACEMENT RATES 
Fig. 3. Failure model elements. 
·. 
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Failure models can be theoretical or empirical. Theoretical models 
may, very rarely, be derived from the fundamental physics of the equipment, 
but usually are derived from engineering estimates. By this we usually mean 
design specifications--which are often estimates--and intuition. In some 
of these areas we're looking at, such as Army ground vehicles, engineering 
estimates turn out to be a major source of failure models. Empirical models 
are usually based on fail ure data. And the problem we have with them is 
that the models are derived from failure rate and not from failure modes. 
So you know how many units failed, but you don't know exactly what components 
are fai l ing. Worse than that , the so-called failure rate data are often 
replacement rate data, which gives little information about the cause of 
failure. For example, the favorite way of fixing Army ground vehicles is 
repair by replacement, so if you count replaced parts and use the replace-
ment rates to formulate fa i lure models, you can be off by nearly an order 
of magnitude in some cases. 
In Fig. 4, I've arranged various functions of diagnostic aids in 
what seems to be a logical order, all the way from failing and failure 
detection to fault isolation and health monitoring, up to failure prediction. 
Experience so far indicates that, as you go up the ladder from fault isol ation 
to failure prediction, the diagnostic systems become increasingly complex, 
with greater requirements for data, for information processing and display, 
etc. I personally don ' t believe that this is the way things have to go. In 
fact, several efforts are underway to work out some sort of diagnostic aid, 
for health monitoring, for example, that is relatively simple, perhaps based 
on the infrequent measurement of one or two characteristics and us ing one 
diagnostic parameter. However, that is a hope for the future. The history 
to date is one of increasing complexity. 
And finally, let me emphasize that a failure model should not be cast 
in concrete and then forever used as the bible, but should be altered as 
you learn more and more about the system being diagnosed . 
Now, let's discuss some issues--which are really preliminary conclusions 
of my work, but since they require further supporting evidence, we'll call 
them issues (see Fig. 5). 
First of all, hardware technology doesn't seem to be the problem. It's 
clear that we need better and cheaper hardware; we need cheaper and more 
reliable transducers, for instance. However, all the technology we really 
need seems to be available, except the technology relating to failure models . 
I realize that this is extending the word "technology" perhaps past what is 
usual, but, in my view, failure models are a part of technology, and there's 
a lot of work that needs to be done in this area . 
Relating monitored characteristics to diagnostic parameters is also 
a serious problem, the typical difficult software problem. As a result, I 
feel that the system engineering and general technical direction of diagnostic 
aid systems has been inadequate and has produced more confusion than satis-
faction. In recent months there have been attempts to justify diagnostic aid 
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DIAGNOSTIC AID SYSTEMS 
FUNCTION I SENS ING I INFO. PROCESSING / I FAILURE MODEL . DISPLAY 
N I 
1 1 1 
0 FAILURE PREDICTION 
HEALTH MON ITORING I MORE SENSORS MORE DATA BETTER MODELS 
FAULT ISOLATION I BETTER SENSORS MORE PROCESS lNG MORE COMPLEX 
MORE SAMPLES MORE DETAILED DISPLAYS BETTER DATA BASES 
I I 
FA ILl NG/ FA I LURE 
DETECTION 
Fig. 4. Functions of diagnostic aid systems. 
  
ISSUES 
• TECHNOLOGY IN TERMS OF HARDWARE (SENSORS, PROCESSORS, 
DISPLAYS) IS NOT THE PROBLEM NOW 
• TECHNOLOGY IN TERMS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART IN FAILURE MODELS 
IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM 
• RELATING MONITORED CHARACTERISTIC TO DIAGNOSTIC 
PARAMETERS IS ALSO A SERIOUS PROBLEM 
• SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL DIRECTION (AS A RESULT 
OF ABOVE) HAVE BEEN GENERALLY INADEQUATE 
• COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSES HAVE BEEN TOO NARROW AND BASED 
ON TENUOUS ASSUMPTIONS 
• REAL COST EFFECTIVENESS LIES IN REDUCING INVENTORIES, 
INCREAS ING UTILIZATION AND REDUCING MAINTENANCE MANPOWER, 
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 
• BROAD VIEW OF UTILITY HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN 
POST PRODUCTION CHECKS --. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
Fig. 5. Key issues in the appli cation of diagnostic aid systems. 
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systems on the basis of cost-effectiveness studies. I've looked at several 
of these studies and have concluded that generally they have been too narrow 
and based on very tenuous assumptions. All of them are based on the assump-
tion that failure rates equal replacement rates, which I've discussed earlier . 
And studies repeatedly conclude that diagnostic aids are cost-effective 
because they save the replacement of good components or subsystems. However, 
my view is that the use of diagnostic aid systems and NDE can, in fact, 
have a much greater impact than just saving good parts . It can cause major 
changes in maintenance structures and modes. It can even change operational 
modes for equipment. I believe that t rue cost-effectiveness of diagnostic 
aids lies in reducing inventories, increasing utilization, and reducing 
maintenance manpower, equipment, and facilities. 
As far as equipment life and usage goes, the point here is that if we 
are going to talk about diagnostic aid systems for a particular set of 
military equipment, we'd better take a good look at that military equipment 
first. Certain classical "age" indicators, such as vehicle mileage, may or 
may not be valid indicators, depending on the level of vehicle usage. Many 
diagnostic aid systems have been designed for high mileage vehicles, yet the 
average annual mileage for a 2~-ton Army truck is less than 2000. It turns 
out that mileage, which is often thought of as a good diagnostic parameter, 
is good only for high usage, high mileage vehicles. With low mileage 
vehicles, vehicle failures are more closely related to the number of engine 
starts than to the miles driven . (See Fig. 6.) For tanks, it turns out that 
tank failures may be related more closely to the number of times the gun was 
fired than to either the mileage or the engine starts. The message is clear: 
Take a good look at the equipment and how it's being used before selecting 
the diagnostic parameters. 
In l ooking at the l ife phases of Army vehicles (Fig. 7) we find that 
diagnostic aids play different roles at different phases of the life cycle. 
They have greater utility than their maintenance orientation. An important 
function is postproduction checks. By this, I mean not only diagnosis of 
newly acquired equipment, but using a diagnostic aid system to check the 
unit after any design change introduces a new component or subsystem. By 
identifying faulty components and interactions early, such postproduction 
checks can prevent unhealthy systems from entering the inventory, and 
reduce the introduction of less reliable parts. 
It turns out that Army acquisition of unhealthy vehicles produces 
maintenance nightmares from the day they arrive. There hasn't been a really 
good way to figure this out until things start failing--and usually, with 
this type of vehicle, it isn ' t a case of a single failure; many things fail 
in rapid succession. Also, there have been many occasions when the services 
have bought what is supposed to be a more reliable part or substance, and in 
reality they ' ve acquired a less reliable one. In fact , the Army recently 
finished testing its new so-called "5000-mile tank tread", which actually 
goes about 500 miles--5000 mile design, 500 mi l e actual performance. So 
there is a case to be made for using diagnostic aid systems to reduce this 
kind of problem. 
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Fig. 6. Engine start and mileage characteristics for 2-1/2 ton Army trucks 
in various operation modes. The arrow indicates the average annual mileage. 
  
INFANCY 
POST PRODUCTION CHECK 
TO -
• Prevent Unhealthy 
Systems from 
Entering Inventory 
VEHICLE LIFE PHASES 
3 
• Identify Faulty 
Components 
and Inter-
actions Early 
FAILURE 
• Establish Early 
History of 
Subsystems and 
Components 
• Reduce Intra-
duction Ra te of 
Less Reliable 
Parts 
RATE* 
l 
0 
I nfanc $_...;M...;a;.;t.::.;ur..;.ity..__f Longevity 
VEHICLE AGE 
*Normalized to Design Rates 
Fig. 7. Life phases of Army vehicles . 
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Also, a diagnostic aid system may turn out to be one of the best data 
col l ection tools you have for finding out what really happens to a piece of 
equipment. I'll go into this in more detail later. 
In the maturity/longevity phase of equi pment life, diagnostic aids 
are used in the ways more commonly thought of, to reduce unscheduled 
maintenance and repair actions and to extend scheduled maintenance inter-
vals. An important use is to verify maintenance and repair actions. We've 
noticed particularly in some Army vehicles, that whenever something fails and 
is repaired, it fa i ls again roughly twice as fast, and fails three times as 
fast the third time. One has to ask whether or not the initial repair action 
is bringing the system back to anywhere near its ori gi nal condition. 
A major problem is that many of the failure data collection activities 
revolve around the operator of the equipment or the people who perform the 
maintenance on it, and these people are graded as an operator on how many 
times the truck fails or doesn't fail. So, they are not exactly inspired 
to report all f ailures faithfully. The same thing happens with the mainten-
ance personnel. If they are asked to report their diagnostic activities 
without any kind of checking or overview, they're wonderful; they can 
diagnose anything, anywhere , any time. But it doesn't happen that way. 
These biases are not present with the diagnostic aid system, and 
therefore, it provides more accurate and reliable data on which to build 
and refi ne failure models. To repeat an important point about f ailure 
models, they should not be set in concret e and then used forever as the 
Bible, but should be designed to be modifiable as you learn more and more 
about the system. If they are not readily alterable, problems will develop. 
There are also human engineering problems--such as digital versus 
analog di splays . Everything I've seen so far says go digital. Particularly 
when you're dealing with systems which involve as many as 25 different 
measurements, al l of which are taken on different scal es. It 's similar 
to the old multivoltmet er problem where you have a needl e running across 
several di fferent scales and you've got to figure out which scale to use. 
From a user orientation, digital displays , which automatically read out in 
units of the appropriate scale , are highly preferred. 
Maintenance manuals are an old problem. let me reiterate what I'm 
sure you've heard many times, that the guy in the field can't read technical 
documentation. He needs something simple, clear, explicit, and written in 
user language. 
Now , the diagnostic orientation runs squarely up against much of the 
maintenance training activity in the Army: peopl e are trained to replace 
things, not to find out what's wrong with them. And so, it 's going to 
require newer kinds of training to get people to really think as trouble-
shooters. 
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As part of our project, we are looking at commercial diagnostic aid 
systems, and I'm beginning to question the need for military specs across 
the board . Some commerci al diagnostic aid systems I've investigated look 
as though they could go right into the military inventory without any 
redesign to military specs, which, of course, can increase the price by 
an order of magnitude. A problem here is trying to interest commercial 
vehicle suppliers in diagnostic aid systems. The commercial R&D people 
have a minimal interest in diagnostic aid systems, because their motivation 
is very much tied to keeping vehicle costs as low as possible. However, I 
have been talking with them, trying to point out that lowering lifetime 
costs can be a strong selling point. What I'm trying to do is excite some 
of the people in commercial R&D to get more into the diagnostic aid busi-
ness. They have far more R&D resources to do this, of course , than the 
Government does. 
Both in the Air Force and in the Army the diagnostic aid systems 
that now exist have reliab ility and maintainability problems. Across the 
board, the systems existing today do not have acceptable reliability. A 
lot of it is what I call front end problems--that is, the problem is not 
in the processor, it's in the transducers, and the leads to the transducers, 
and that kind of area. This seems to be something t ha t can be corrected 
simply by better design and manufacturing techniques. Also, diagnostic 
aid systems ought to include self-test features. One of the real problems 
in using a diagnostic aid system is knowing the operability of the system 
itself. This has been a neglected feature. 
Figure 8 summarizes the main issues discussed here. There are many 
payoff areas for diagnostic aid systems, including saving parts, changing 
maintenance structures, reducing personnel, reducing equipment inventories, 
and increasing utilization of equipment. These benefits are obvious, in a 
sense, but difficult to treat analytically. The reason is the difficulty 
of getting accurate and meaningful data--operational, maintenance, and 
cost data, as well as manpower data. 
Failure models are just not well developed, and in some cases diagnostic 
aid systems are really R&D hobby items. People have built them because they 
test and measure things, and when they measure enough things, they lead you 
to some sort of tentative conclusion that something is wrong. The only 
problem is that when you put them to a test, it turns out that they tell you 
that all kinds of things are wrong that aren't, and they don't tell you 
certain things that really are wrong. 
We need "smart" data, not more data. Whenever you get into a study 
that touches on maintenance, there's a tendency to want to collect an awful 
lot of data, and indeed there are large data collections sitting around. 
Some of them will forever be sitting around because you can't get into 
them to get the informatiQn you want, or else the data is not reliable or 
accurate enough. Let me say that I am a firm believer that when any data 
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SUMMARY 
e HIGH PAYOFF AREAS IN THE APPLICATIONS OF DIAGNOSTIC AIDS ARE OBVIOUS 
BUT DIFFICULT TO TREAT ANALYTICALLY 
e THE TECHNOLOGY OF DIAGNOSTIC AID SYSTEMS-PARTICULARLY FAILURE MODELS 
IS NOT WELL DEVELOPED 
e MEANINGFUL STUDIES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND COSTS OF DIAGNOSTIC AID 
SYSTEMS REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF MAINTENANCE STRUCTURES, 
MODES AND COSTS 
e STUDIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN TOO NARROW IN SCOPE AND APPROACH 
e "SMART" NOT LARGE DATA COLliCTION EFFORTS ARE NEEDED 
Fig. 8. Summary of the status of diagnostic aid systems. 
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collection system is being designed, the analyst should be in at the front 
end to reflect on what kind of data will be valuable and what form it 
should be in . Otherwise, the design engineers may make provisions to give 
you all the data they can possibly think of, and it may not be what you 
need . 
And finally, in this ARPA-sponsored activity, we are trying to find out 
if there is a high payoff for increased ROTE investments in diagnostic aid 
systems, and, if so, where should the ROTE dollars go . 
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DISCUSSION 
DR. DON THOMPSON (Science Center, Rockwell International): Thank you 
very much, Bill. 
DR. PAUL PACKMAN (Vanderbilt University): Not necessarily a question but 
a comment regarding this NDT data base. There is a tremendous amount 
of data available for quantitative evaluation for detection sensitivity. 
DR. WHELAN : Well, as I said earlier, the relationship between diagnostic 
aid systems and NDE is the exercise for the listener. What I am 
concerned about is that people are trying to measure all kinds of 
failures i n large complicated subsystems of amazingly complex systems. 
For a lot of t he components in those subsystems, a good NDE technique 
doesn't exist or nobody has looked at that component to see what it is 
made of. So I am concerned that these diagnostic aid systems may be 
biting off a lot more than they can really handle. 
I am sure that the data problems that you refer to exist in 
diagnostic aid systems as well as in the NDE activities you mention. 
Someone has collected data for a certain problem, and when you try 
to apply it to another problem, you find out that certain pieces of 
the data are not useful and usually you need something that was not 
collected originally. 
COL. RON NOKES (Kelly Air Force Base): I gather your study is more 
oriented toward the management line of diagnostics. It's not really 
going to get into the final details technically. It would appear to 
me that there 's a lot of engine diagnostic systems on aircraft engines 
and they're all in competition with each other. There doesn't appear 
to be any single organization that has taken a look at the whole 
picture. 
DR. WHELAN: That's what I came to very quickly. I started out looking at 
i ndividual automotive engine diagnostic aids, and backed off, saying 
that the problem is bigger than just one of these systems. 
COL. RON NOKES: You can go further than that , because there are several 
aircraft engine diagnostic systems that are being procured now? 
DR. WHELAN: Yes, the Army recently has taken an interesting step by 
forming a Department of the Army--! stress that to show you it's 
up high enough--a Department of the Anmy Central TMDE Product Management 
Office (TMDE standing for Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment). 
The Army regulation creating this office gave it broad powers, causing 
several problems. For example, it impl ied that the TMDE people have 
the authority to veto the procurement of a system if it doesn't have 
adequate TMDE equipment. Now, the first time they tried to exercise 
that, they got thrown out of the room. But it's interesting that 
that kind of activity is being centralized and they're worried about 
the proliferation of diagnostic, test, and measurement equipment. 
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COL. RON NOKES: ~1i-ten wi 11 you have a fi na 1 report on the efforts 
you're doing? 
DR . WHELAN: About the end of the year. 
DR . DON THOMPSON: One more question. 
MR. STUHRKE (Martin-Marietta): We have a program at Martin that I think is 
worth commenting on here. We had a program with Rome Air Development 
Center for about six to eight years on component reliability and it 
bears on what you're talking about. 
We've taken an approach a little bit different from what yours is. 
We go into a system, do a fault free analysis on it where you determine 
what are the critical parts. Then we develop data on these critical 
parts and their failure rate. Now, at the very base level with an 
electronic component, for example, its a go/no-go affair if the 
transistor fails or it doesn't, and we've developed these data in 
rel i ability handbooks. 
The program is being sponsored by Mr. Winzikowski at Rome Air 
Development Center and these reports are available. We've applied 
these programs and developed actual equations which would predict 
failures, which l ook just like yours. You know, you have the infant 
mortality, when you have a nice area where very little happens and 
t hen through old age i t begins to break down and we have applied 
this basically to the Sprint system which, as you're aware, is now 
i n the field. 
We predicted, based on these reliability numbers which take 
into account both a dormant state and active state for different 
reliability numbers, and were able to pr diet very closely the 
reliability availability of the system. In other words, out of a 
hundred missi les, if I pushed the button, what proba bility do I 
have the thing will work? Not only will it work, will it hit the 
target? And this has worked very well goi ng at it from t he very 
bottom. 
Now, you mentioned another aspect, too, the commercial aspect . 
We have been working with several of the automotive companies at the 
component level again . It was announced very recently, for example, 
that Chrysler this year is going to be buildi ng an electronic engine. 
They're putting a sealed PC board system into the motor, which will 
control the spark, the spark advance and all of these sorts of things. 
We have been working with them to evaluate the types of reliability 
that they need to determine how many of these they have to have out 
in the field and just the whole maintenance cycle. 
We're developing this reliabi l ity number based on the rel iability 
of the individual component and also how they go together, and, in 
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 contrast to one of the things you said, we need lots of data 
rather than smart data . We found in this six to seven year system 
what we need is lots and lots of data. We're talking about hundreds 
of millions of part hours. 
Also, there is another component program which looks at 
mechanical reliability where we've gone around to various aircraft 
companies and the airlines, primarily, to get data on the failure of 
their mechanical systems. For example, a landing gear actuator 
system. Did the cylinder fail, did the bearing fail, did the hydraulic 
line fail; and we're developing part hour data on this which will come 
out in about a year. 
I think this is an alternative approach to looking at the big 
things, to start from the bottom. My only comment is that it really 
works, and I think that we need to look at this approach as well. 
DR. WHELAN: I think it's a very valid alternative approach that you've 
just pointed out. Certain operational problems in the military service 
are causing people to want to do something in a very immediate sense, 
but I think both approaches should certainly go on and we should talk 
about it sometime. 
31 
